On the marginal value of electricity storage by Bitar, E et al.
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Recent Work
Title
On the marginal value of electricity storage
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0dk1r6gq
Journal
Systems & Control Letters, 123
ISSN
0167-6911
Authors
Bitar, Eilyan
Khargonekar, Pramod
Poolla, Kameshwar
Publication Date
2019
DOI
10.1016/j.sysconle.2018.09.007
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
1On the Marginal Value of Electricity Storage∗
Eilyan Bitara, Pramod Khargonekarb, and Kameshwar Poollac
Abstract—We investigate the problem of characterizing the
economic value of energy storage capacity to a wind power
producer (WPP) that sells its energy in a conventional two-
settlement electricity market. The WPP can offer a forward
contract to supply power in the day-ahead market, subject to
financial penalties for imbalances between the contracted power
and the power that is delivered in real-time. We consider the
setting in which the WPP has access to a co-located energy
storage system, and can thus reshape its wind power produc-
tion subject to its storage capacity constraints. Modeling wind
power as a random process, we show that the problem of
determining optimal forward contract offerings—given recourse
with storage—is convex. We further establish that the maximum
expected profit is concave and non-decreasing in the energy
storage capacity, which reveals that the greatest marginal benefit
from energy storage is derived from initial investment in small
storage capacity. We provide a characterization of the marginal
value of small energy storage capacity to the WPP. The formulae
we derive shed light on the relationship between the value of
storage and certain statistical measures of variability in the
underlying wind power process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by concerns of climate change and energy security,
there is a growing worldwide investment in renewable energy
[2]. The available supply of power from sources like wind
and solar is variable—it is uncertain, intermittent, and largely
uncontrollable. These characteristics pose major challenges to
the deep integration of renewables into the grid [3]–[5].
There is considerable investment and interest in energy
storage as a means to mitigate the variability of renewable
generation [6]–[11]. For instance, California’s strategic storage
mandate calls for 1.3 GW of ramping capability to be com-
missioned by 2020. Hydro-power has traditionally been used
for such purposes [12]. While pumped hydro is an efficient
and flexible storage modality, its siting is geographically
constrained and thus offers limited balancing capability to the
system at large due to transmission constraints. As utility-scale
renewable energy resources continue to proliferate, the ability
to directly shape their power output with alternative forms of
electric energy storage becomes more compelling.
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In this paper, we investigate the ability of energy storage to
mitigate the cost of balancing variable renewable power. The
perspective taken is that of a wind power producer (WPP),
whose objective is to sell its variable power in conventional,
two-settlement energy markets akin to those previously studied
in [13]–[20]. In such markets, imbalances arising between the
contracted and realized supply of power are subject to financial
penalty. Accordingly, we quantify the value of co-located
energy storage in terms of its ability to reduce the expected
cost of such contract imbalances, and, thereby, increase the
profitability of wind power in such markets.
A. Contribution and Related Work
Energy storage devices such as pumped-hydro, compressed
air [21]–[23], sodium-sulfur batteries [24], and more general
battery-based technologies [10] offer the capability to firm
variable wind power. The ability to do so depends centrally
on the placement, sizing, and control of such energy storage
systems. For a review of papers that consider the problem of
optimally siting energy storage in (deterministic) transmission-
constrained power systems, we refer the reader to [25]–[27].
There are also a number of papers that explore the economic
viability of these hybrid wind-storage systems in producing
baseload generation [7], [28], [29]. These studies conclude
that such hybrid systems compete favorably with gas turbine,
conventional fossil fuel, and nuclear generation.
This paper considers the problem of leveraging energy stor-
age systems to improve the profitability of a wind power pro-
ducer (WPP) participating in a two-settlement energy market.
In the setting considered, the WPP offers a contract for firm
power in the day-ahead market, subject to financial penalty for
deviations between the contracted and realized supply in the
real-time market. The recourse afforded by storage serves to
reduce the risk exposure of the WPP, enabling it to offer larger
contracts, which in turn increases its expected profit. We show
that the optimal contract sizing problem reduces to convex
programming. We also prove that the maximum expected profit
of the WPP is a concave and non-decreasing function of the
storage capacity. As a result, the greatest marginal benefit is
derived for a small energy storage capacity. In Theorem V.5,
we provide an explicit characterization of the marginal value of
small energy storage capacity in terms of a specific statistical
measure of variation in the underlying wind power process.
There are a number of related papers in the literature,
which attempt to characterize the economic value of energy
storage capacity across a variety of electricity market settings
using either deterministic (offline) optimization methods [30]–
[32], stochastic optimization methods [13], [33], online convex
optimization methods [34], or dynamic programming-based
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2methods [35]–[40]. With the exception of [35], [36], the
majority of the aforementioned papers calculate the economic
value of storage capacity using sensitivity analyses that are
largely numerical in nature—in contrast to the closed-form
marginal value expressions established in this paper. Closer to
the approach adopted in this paper, the authors in [35], [36]
derive analytical expressions for the marginal value of storage,
albeit under the somewhat restrictive assumption that the wind
power generated in each time period be uniformly distributed.
In contrast, the structural and marginal value results derived
in this paper are distribution-free, in the sense that they hold
for any (possibly nonstationary) wind power process with an
absolutely continuous joint distribution. We note, however, that
an important limitation of our results is their reliance upon the
assumption of constant real-time imbalance prices.
Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. Sections II and III describe the models that we
employ in our analysis, and formulate the specific problems
that we address, respectively. Our main results are presented in
Sections IV and V, followed by concluding remarks in Section
VI.
Notation: For any finite set A, we denote its cardinality
by |A|. Let N denote the set of non-negative integers, R the
set of real numbers, R+ the non-negative reals, and RN the
usual Euclidean space. For x ∈ R, let x+ = max{x, 0} and
x− = min{x, 0}. For any subset A ⊆ RN , we define the
indicator function 1A : RN → {0, 1} as
1A(x) =
{
1, x ∈ A
0, x /∈ A.
II. SUPPLY, STORAGE AND MARKET MODELS
A. Intermittent Supply Model
Time is slotted and indexed by k. The intermittent genera-
tion of the WPP in time period k is ξk. This is normalized to
nameplate so ξk ∈ [0, 1]. We model the wind farm output as
a discrete-time random process ξ = (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξN−1). Let
Φk(x) = P{ξk ≤ x}, k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (1)
denote the cumulative distribution function of ξk. Define the
time-averaged cumulative distribution function as
F (x) =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Φk(x). (2)
We assume that the intermittent supply has a zero cost of
production, as it is derived from wind and solar energy.
B. Energy Storage Model
We consider a simple energy balance model [11] for per-
fectly efficient energy storage1:
zk+1 = zk − uk, k = 0, 1, · · · (3)
1The assumption of perfectly efficient storage is for ease of exposition.
All of our results can be generalized to accommodate non-ideal storage
systems with leakage and energy conversion inefficiencies. See Remark 2
for a discussion on such generalization.
Here, zk ≥ 0 represents the amount of energy in the storage
at the beginning of time slot k, and uk denotes the energy
that is extracted from or injected into the storage during time
slot k. The sign convention is such that uk > 0 corresponds
to an energy extraction, and uk < 0 corresponds to an energy
injection. Without loss of generality, we assume a zero initial
condition, z0 = 0. We impose the state and input constraints:
0 ≤ zk ≤ b (4)
−r ≤ uk ≤ r (5)
to capture the energy capacity b and the maximum charg-
ing/discharging rate r. We refer to the storage type as the
parameter vector θ = (b, r).
C. Market Model
We consider a two-settlement electricity market consisting
of a day-ahead (DA) market and a real-time (RT) imbalance
market. In the DA market, a generator can submit offers to
produce power over the following day according to a sequence
of power contracts that are typically piecewise constant over
hour-long time intervals. Normally, the DA market will close
for offers by 10 AM, and clears by 1 PM on the day
immediately preceding the delivery day. The contracts cleared
in the DA market are binding and call for delivery in the RT
market, where uninstructed deviations between the contracted
power and the delivered power are penalized according to
imbalance prices determined in the RT market.2
Day-Ahead (DA) Market: In this paper, we restrict our
analysis to a single DA contract interval, which we discretize
into N time slots reflecting the finer temporal granularity of
RT market operations.3 We let x ∈ R (MWh) denote the
offered contract, which is taken to be constant across the N
time slots defining the contract interval. The supplier is payed
according to the DA market clearing price p ∈ R+ ($/MWh)
associated with that contract interval. This yields the supplier
a revenue of N · px in the DA market.
Real-Time (RT) Market. As the forward contract x is
offered with significant lead time on delivery, deviations
naturally arise between the offered contract and the delivered
power. These contract deviations are penalized according to
imbalance prices derived from the RT market. A shortfall in
generation during period k is penalized at a price α ∈ R+
($/MWh), while an excess in generation is penalized at a
price β ∈ R+ ($/MWh). Typically, deviations from hour-long
forward contracts are measured on a finer temporal granularity
corresponding to intervals of length five minutes. Accordingly,
we consider a temporal discretization of the contract interval
into N discrete time periods, where each period’s imbalance
is measured relative to the baseline contract x. We also note
2We note that the market model considered in this paper conforms with the
prevailing literature on the integration of wind power through two-settlement
electricity markets [1], [14]–[17], [20], [41].
3We note that it is straightforward to extend the formulation and results
presented in this paper to accommodate the more general setting in which a
supplier can offer a sequence of multiple DA contracts (e.g., one for each hour
of the day) that are remunerated according to the corresponding sequence of
hourly DA market prices. We refer the reader to Section II-C of [1] for the
mathematical details of such a formulation.
3that, in practice, a WPP may possess the ability to physically
curtail its power output in real-time by pitching its turbine
blades to avoid overproduction imbalance penalties. One can
reflect the economic impact of this curtailment capability by
setting the overproduction imbalance price β equal to zero.
Market Assumptions. We make several common as-
sumptions regarding the determination of prices in the two-
settlement energy market under consideration. First, we as-
sume that the WPP’s production capacity is small relative to
the aggregate capacity of other generators participating in the
DA energy market. Under this assumption, it is fair to assume
that the WPP cannot appreciably affect the determination of
prices. Accordingly, we require the WPP to behave as a price
taker in the DA energy market, and model the DA energy p as
fixed and known at the time of forward contract offering. We
refer the reader to Remark 1, which provides an alternative
interpretation of the optimal forward contract offering as a
supply function offer in the DA market.
Second, as the RT imbalance prices (α, β) are not known
to the WPP at the time of committing to a forward contract
in the DA market, we model them as random variables whose
expected values at the time of forward contract offering are
denoted by
mα = E[α] and mβ = E[β].
Additionaly, the RT imbalance prices (α, β) are assumed to
be independent of the intermittent supply process ξ. Again,
such an assumption is reasonable if the WPP’s production
capacity is small relative to the market size, as the WPP’s
realized contract deviations will have negligible effect on
the determination of prices in the RT market. Naturally, this
assumption may need to be reexamined for markets scenarios
in which the aggregate capacity of participating wind power
producers is large. We refer the reader to several recent papers
[16], [19], which treat the possibility of correlation between
imbalance prices and wind power in simpler settings without
energy storage.
Finally, we make the following technical assumption.
Assumption 1. The DA market price satisfies p ≤ mα.
From a technical perspective, such an assumption ensures
concavity of the WPP’s expected profit function (6) in the
forward contract x. More practically, this assumption elim-
inates the perverse incentive for the WPP to offer larger
forward contracts in the DA market with the explicit intention
of underproducing in the RT market relative to the offered
forward contract.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Working within this idealized setting, we now formalize
the question of how a generator with intermittent supply
might optimize a forward contract offering for energy given
a subsequent sequence of recourse opportunities to reshape
the realized supply profile using a constrained energy storage
device. Building on intermediary results characterizing the
structure of the optimal value function, the eventual goal is
a parametric sensitivity analysis yielding an explicit charac-
terization of the marginal value of energy storage capacity.
We begin by characterizing the space of admissible, causal
storage control policies.
Admissible Control Policies: An admissible storage control
policy pi = (µ0, . . . , µN−1) is any finite sequence of decision
functions that causally map from the available information to
actions, and respect constraints on both the input to and state
of storage. We define the system state at period k as the pair
(zk, ξk) ∈ R+ × R+, where we recall that zk represents the
energy storage state just preceding period k, while ξk denotes
the intermittent supply realized during period k. We assume
perfect state feedback and consider control policies with full
information history. Namely, the information available to any
controller at time k is the vector Ik := (x, z≤k, ξ≤k), where
z≤k = (z0, . . . , zk) and ξ≤k = (ξ0, . . . , ξk). Naturally, we
allow the control policy to depend explicitly on the forward
contract x . A control policy pi thus defines the map
uk = µk(Ik) for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
where uk ∈ R is the input to the storage system at time k.
We now characterize the space of admissible control poli-
cies, as determined by the storage type θ = (b, r). We define
the feasible state space Z(b) as the set of all energy stor-
age states respecting the energy capacity constraint. Namely,
Z(b) = {z ∈ R+ | 0 ≤ z ≤ b}. Given an energy storage state
z ∈ Z(b), we define the corresponding feasible input space as
the set of all inputs belonging to
U(z; θ) = {u ∈ R | z − u ∈ Z(b), |u| ≤ r},
which guarantees one-step state feasibility and input rate
constraint satisfaction.
Definition III.1 (Admissible policies). A control policy pi =
(µ0, . . . , µN−1) is deemed admissible if
µk(Ik) ∈ U(zk; θ)
almost surely for all Ik and k = 0, . . . , N − 1. We denote
by Π(θ) the space of all admissible control policies with full
information history.
Criterion: We define the expected profit Jpi(x; θ) derived by
a supplier, with a storage of type θ, as the revenue derived from
a forward contract offering x less the expected imbalance cost
incurred under an admissible storage control policy pi ∈ Π(θ).
More precisely, we define the expected profit as
Jpi(x; θ) = N · px − E
[
N−1∑
k=0
g(x, upik , ξk)
]
, (6)
where expectation is taken with respect to (α, β, ξ) and
g(x, upik , ξk) denotes the imbalance cost realized at each time
period k. More precisely, we have
g(x, u, ξ) = α (x− ξ − u)+ + β (ξ + u− x)+ . (7)
Notice that the stage cost g is indeed a convex function of its
arguments. For notational concision, we suppress the depen-
dency of g on the imbalance prices (α, β). In addition, we will
occasionally write the storage state and control processes as
{zpik } and {upik} to emphasize their dependence on the storage
control policy pi.
4We wish to characterize forward contract offerings x and
control policies pi that together yield a maximum expected
profit. This amounts to the solution of a two-stage stochastic
program, where the recourse problem constitutes a constrained
stochastic control problem. Problem optimality is defined as
follows.
Definition III.2 (Optimality). An admissible pair (pi∗, x∗) ∈
Π(θ)× R is deemed optimal if
Jpi
∗
(x∗; θ) ≥ Jpi(x; θ) for all (pi, x) ∈ Π(θ)× R.
We will occasionally write the optimal value function and
an optimal solution pair as J∗(θ) and (pi∗(θ), x∗(θ)), re-
spectively, to emphasize their parametric dependency on the
storage type parameter θ.
The optimal forward contract may be non-unique. In order
to avoid technical issues associated with such non-uniqueness,
we will restrict our attention to smallest contract among all
optimal contracts for each θ. Specifically, define the minimal
optimal contract as x∗(θ) = inf X ∗(θ), where X ∗(θ) = {x ∈
R | Jpi∗(θ)(x; θ) ≥ Jpi∗(θ)(y; θ) ∀ y ∈ R} denotes the set of
all optimal contracts associated with a storage type θ.
IV. OPTIMAL CONTRACT PROPERTIES
We now characterize the optimal storage control policy
and establish concavity of the expected profit criterion in the
forward contract x.
A. Optimal Contract Sizing for b = 0
Consider first the special case of optimal contract sizing in
the absence of storage, i.e. b = 0. Naturally, in the absence of
storage capacity, the set of admissable storage control policies
is identically zero. And the problem of selecting a forward
contract to maximize the expected profit reduces to a so-called
newsvendor problem [42]. The convexity of this optimization
problem is guaranteed under our postulated assumptions. We
have the following result established in [15], [16].
Lemma IV.1. Consider a storage type θ ∈ R2+ with b = 0.
The corresponding optimal contract is given by the quantile
x∗(θ) = F−1 (γ) := inf{x ∈ R | F (x) ≥ γ}, (8)
where γ := (p+mβ)/(mα +mβ) ∈ [0, 1].
The quantile structure of the optimal contract will prove
essential to characterizing the marginal value of storage at the
origin, which we present in Theorem V.5.
Remark 1 (Supply Function Offer). It is also worth noting
that the optimal contract specified in (8) is a monotone
nondecreasing function in the DA market price p. Hence, the
optimal contract can be equivalently interpreted as a supply
function offer in the DA market, which indicates the maximum
amount of energy that the WPP is willing to produce given
a price p. Accordingly, all of the results presented in this
paper can be shown to hold for the more general setting in
which the WPP does not have explicit knowledge of the DA
market price, but rather offers a supply function into the DA
market, which specifies the amount it is willing to produce as
a function of price. It is important to note that the validity
of this interpretation is reliant upon the assumption that the
WPP behaves as a price taker in the DA market, which ensures
that it has no influence on the determination of the DA market
price.
B. Optimal Contract Sizing for b > 0
In the presence of positive storage capacity, b > 0, the
selection of an optimal forward contract will naturally depend
on the storage type implicitly through the choice of optimal
control policy pi∗ ∈ Π(θ). We now characterize the optimal
control policy in Proposition IV.2.
Proposition IV.2 (Optimal control policy). Given a storage
type θ ∈ R2+, the optimal control policy pi∗ = (µ∗, . . . , µ∗) ∈
Π(θ) is (i) myopic and (ii) of a threshold-type satisfying
µ∗(x, z, ξ) =
{
min{x− ξ, z, r}, ξ ≤ x
−min{ξ − x, b− z, r}, ξ > x (9)
for all (x, z, ξ) ∈ R+ ×Z(b)× R+.
We omit the proof of Proposition IV.2, as optimality of the
control policy (9) can be shown by direct inspection of the
corresponding dynamic programming equations.
While we do not offer an explicit expression for the optimal
contract size in this more general setting, we establish in The-
orem IV.3 concavity of the expected profit criterion Jpi
∗
(x; θ)
in the contract size x, under the optimal control policy pi∗
specified in (9). See Appendix A for a proof of Theorem IV.3.
Theorem IV.3 (Convexity of optimal contract sizing). Let
pi∗ ∈ Π(θ) denote the optimal control policy associated with
a storage of type θ and a particular forward contract x ∈ R+.
Then, the expected profit Jpi
∗
(x; θ) is a concave function in x
over R+.
It follows from Theorem IV.3 that an optimal contract can
be computed by solving a finite-dimensional, unconstrained
convex optimization problem given by supx∈R
{
Jpi
∗
(x; θ)
}
.
V. THE MARGINAL VALUE OF STORAGE
As the cost required to deploy a storage facility can be
large, it is of vital importance to quantify the fiscal benefit that
a wind power producer (WPP) might derive from an initial
investment in energy storage capacity. Theorem IV.3 shows
that the problem of computing optimal contract offerings and
the corresponding optimal expected profit is a convex program.
In the following Theorem V.1, we show that the optimal
expected profit function J∗(θ) is concave and nondecreasing
in the storage type θ = (b, r).
Theorem V.1. The maximum expected profit J∗(θ) is concave
and nondecreasing in the storage type parameter θ ∈ R2+.
We refer the reader to Appendix B for a proof of
Theorem V.1. The consequences of the Theorem V.1 are
twofold. First, consider the problem of optimal storage sizing
supθ∈R2+ {J∗(θ)− C(θ)}, where C(θ) denotes the capital cost
of energy storage capacity. If we assume a convex capital
5cost function4, then Theorem V.1 reveals that the problem of
optimal storage sizing reduces to a finite-dimensional, convex
optimization problem. Second, the concavity and monotonicity
of the maximum expected profit function J∗(θ) in the storage
type θ shows that the marginal value of storage capacity is
greatest for initial investments in storage capacity. In Theorem
V.5, we provide a closed-form expression for the marginal
value of energy storage capacity ∂J∗(θ)/∂b at the origin
(b = 0).
A. γ-Quantile Level Crossings
In Theorem V.5, we make precise the intuition that a larger
variation in the intermittent supply process will manifest in a
larger value of storage. In particular, we establish an explicit
relationship between the marginal value of storage capacity at
the origin and a specific measure of variation of the underlying
intermittent supply process. Before stating our main result,
we first establish a preliminary result in Lemma V.4, which
quantifies the expected number of times a stochastic process
exceeds a fixed level over a fixed interval of time. We have
the following definition.
⇠k
k
x
Fig. 1. A graphical illustration of the times at which a process ξ = {ξk}
exhibits strict upcrossings (◦) and strict downcrossings (×) of a fixed level
x. For this example, we have that ΛN (x, ξ) = 3.
Definition V.2 (Strict level crossing). A scalar sequence a =
(a0, . . . , aN−1) is said to have a strict downcrossing of the
level x ∈ R at time k if ak > x and ak+1 < x. Thus, a
strict downcrossing of x at time k corresponds to the event
x ∈ Dk(a), where we define Dk(a) = {y ∈ R | ak > y >
ak+1}. Analogously, the sequence a is said to have a strict
upcrossing of the level x at time k if x ∈ Uk(a), where we
define Uk(a) = {y ∈ R | ak < y < ak+1}.
See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of Definition V.2.
We make the following technical assumption in order to
restrict our attention to strict level crossings.
Assumption 2. The joint distribution of the intermittent supply
process ξ is assumed to be absolutely continuous.
Under Assumption 2, sample paths of the process ξ are, with
probability one, not identically equal to x ∈ R for any k. More
4This is a standard assumption in the literature. In fact, it is common to
assume, more strongly, that the capital cost of energy storage capacity is linear
[7], [12].
precisely, we have that P(
⋃
k{ξk = x}) ≤
∑
k P {ξk = x} =
0. Henceforth, we shall refer to all strict crossings as crossings,
unless otherwise unclear from the context.
Definition V.3 (Number of Strict Downcrossings). We denote
the number of strict downcrossings of x ∈ R incurred
by a scalar sequence a = (a0, . . . , aN−1) on the interval
{0, . . . , N − 1} by
ΛN (x,a) :=
N−2∑
k=0
1Dk(a)(x). (10)
We will omit the subscript N when it is clear from the context.
We have the following Lemma characterizing the number
of times the intermittent supply process is expected to strictly
exceed, or fall below the quantile F−1(γ). First, define
K+(x, ξ) := {0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 | ξk > x},
K−(x, ξ) := {0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 | ξk < x}
as the number of times which the supply strictly exceeds, and
strictly falls below the level x ∈ R, respectively.
Lemma V.4. Let θ = 0 and denote by x∗ ∈ R+ the cor-
responding optimal contract. The following properties hold:
(i) E|K−(x∗, ξ)| = Nγ
(ii) E|K+(x∗, ξ)| = N(1− γ)
(iii) |K−(x∗, ξ)| + |K+(x∗, ξ)| = N , almost surely,
where γ := (p+mβ)/(mα +mβ).
Lemma V.4 reveals an interesting interpretation of the price
ratio γ ∈ [0, 1]. Namely, in the absence of energy storage
capacity (i.e., θ = 0), the quantile structure of the optimal
contract x∗ = F−1(γ) is such that the fraction of times at
which the intermittent supply is expected to fall short of the
contract is precisely equal to γ.
Proof of Lemma V.4. We first prove part (iii). One can write
the sum as
|K−(x∗, ξ)|+|K+(x∗, ξ)| =
N−1∑
k=0
1(−∞,x∗)(ξk)+1(x∗,∞)(ξk).
The result follows, as Assumption 2 implies that
1(−∞,x∗)(ξk) + 1(x∗,∞)(ξk) = 1 almost surely for all
k. We now establish part (i) through the following string of
equalities:
E|K−(x∗, ξ)| = E
[
N−1∑
k=0
1(−∞,x∗)(ξk)
]
=
N−1∑
k=0
P{ξk < x∗} (a)= N · F (x∗) (b)= Nγ.
Here, equality (a) follows from the definition of the time
averaged distribution F , and (b) follows from the fact that
x∗ = F−1(γ) (cf. Lemma IV.1). Part (ii) is an immediate con-
sequence of parts (i) and (iii), thus completing the proof.
6B. Level Crossings and the Marginal Value of Storage
We now characterize the marginal value of energy storage
capacity at the origin. Essentially, Theorem V.5 reveals that the
marginal value of initial investment in energy storage capacity
depends on the statistical variation of supply, as measured
through its expected number of strict contract downcrossings.
To the best of our knowledge, Theorem V.5 is the first
explicit characterization of the value of storage under general
distributional assumptions on the intermittent supply process—
requiring only that said process have an absolutely continuous
joint distribution. The marginal value characterization (11)
holds for general nonstationary processes. This is a point
of practical importance, as the behavior of wind and solar
power processes have been observed to be far from normal
or stationary. Furthermore, it is straightforward to construct a
consistent empirical estimator of the marginal value statistic
(11) from time series data.
Theorem V.5 (Marginal Value at the Origin). Let r > 0. The
marginal value of energy storage capacity at the origin (b = 0)
exists and is given by
∂J∗(θ)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= (mα +mβ)E[Λ(x∗, ξ)] +mβP{ξN−1 > x∗},
(11)
where x∗ = F−1(γ) and γ := (p+mβ)/(mα +mβ).
See Appendix C for a proof of Theorem V.5. Theorem V.5
has an appealing interpretation. The marginal value of energy
storage capacity at the origin is proportional to the expected
number of energy arbitrage opportunities – or, equivalently,
the expected number of contract downcrossings. As an illus-
trative example, consider a system with a small amount of
energy capacity, b = ε > 0, and power capacity, r > ε. Each
time the intermittent supply process crosses the contract from
above, one has the opportunity to inject an ε amount of energy
into the storage system to decrement the surplus penalty by
β ·ε. This contract downcrossing event is also accompanied by
the additional opportunity to extract ε energy from the storage
device and thus decrement the shortfall penalty by α·ε. Clearly
then, the total realized benefit for small storage capacity is
roughly equal to (α+β)·ε multiplied by the number of energy
arbitrage opportunities. The exact derivation of the marginal
value of storage at the origin is more complex, however, as one
has to additionally account for the sensitivity of the optimal
contract to the storage size.
Remark 2 (Lossy Storage Systems). Theorem V.5 can be
extended to accommodate inefficiencies in storage. Consider
the following generalization of our original storage model:
zk+1 = λzk − 1
ηout
(uk)
+ − ηin(uk)− (12)
for k = 0, . . . , N − 1. Here the scalar λ ∈ (0, 1] represents
a leakage coefficient; and the scalars ηout ∈ (0, 1] and ηin ∈
(0, 1] represent the conversion efficiency of energy extraction
and injection, respectively. We recover our original storage
model under a choice of parameters λ = ηin = ηout = 1.
Working in this more general setting, one can easily establish
a generalization of the marginal value result in Theorem V.5
as
∂J∗(θ)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= (ρmα +mβ)E[Λ(x∗, ξ)] +mβP{ξN−1 > x∗},
(13)
where x∗ = F−1(γ). The parameter ρ := ληinηout ∈ (0, 1]
can be interpreted as a discount factor reflecting the roundtrip
inefficiency associated with an energy arbitrage opportunity
(downcrossing event). Naturally, the more lossy the storage
system, the lower its marginal value. We omit a formal proof
of (13), as it can be established using arguments that are
analogous to those used in the proof of Theorem V.5.
We have the following corollary to Theorem V.5, which is
somewhat surprising. In the event that the intermittent supply
is described by an independent and identically distributed (iid)
random process, the marginal value expression (11) reveals
itself to be insensitive to the choice of probability distribution,
and dependent only on the market prices.
Corollary V.6. Let ξ be and iid process. Then the marginal
value of energy storage capacity at the origin (b = 0) satisfies
∂J∗(θ)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= (N − 1)(mα +mβ)(1− γ)γ + mβ(1− γ),
where γ := (p+mβ)/(mα +mβ).
Proof of Corollary V.6. Using the assumption of indepen-
dence across time, the expected number of strict x∗(0)-level
downcrossings can be expressed as
E[Λ(x∗(0), ξ)] =
N−2∑
k=0
E
[
1Dk(ξ)(x
∗(0))
]
=
N−2∑
k=0
P{ξk > x∗(0), ξk+1 < x∗(0)}
=
N−2∑
k=0
(
1− Φk(x∗(0))
) · Φk+1(x∗(0)).
And, as the marginal distributions are time invariant, we neces-
sarily have equivalence between the time averaged distribution
and each marginal distribution, which yields
E[Λ(x∗(0), ξ)] =
N−2∑
k=0
(1− γ)γ = (N − 1) · (1− γ)γ.
It similarly follows that P{ξN−1 > x∗(0)} = 1 − γ. Direct
substitution of the previous two identities into Equation (11)
yields the desired result.
We establish as an intermediary result in the proof of Corol-
lary V.6 that the expected number of downcrossings satisfies
E[Λ(x∗(0), ξ)] = (N − 1) · (1 − γ)γ, under the assumption
of an iid wind power process. This structural dependency
on the price ratio γ ∈ (0, 1] admits a simple probabilistic
interpretation of the interplay between the volatility of supply
and the value of storage. Specifically, the expected number
of strict downcrossings of the optimal contract level is equal
to the mean of a Binomial random variable with N − 1
7trials and success probability (1 − γ)γ. That is, under the
assumption of an iid wind power process, the sequence of
contract downcrossings can be interpreted as a sequence of
independent coin flips, each of which has a success probability
equal to (1−γ)γ. This probability is maximized for γ = 1/2.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have formulated and solved the problem of
optimal contract sizing for a wind power producer (WPP) par-
ticipating in a conventional two-settlement electricity market,
with co-located energy storage. Specifically, we have shown
that the problem of determining optimal contract offerings for
a WPP with co-located energy storage reduces to an finite-
dimensional convex optimization problem. Our results have
the merit of providing key analytical insight into the trade-offs
between a variety of factors such as energy storage capacity
and maximum expected profit. In particular, we show the
marginal value of storage capacity to be largest for initial
investments, and provide an analytical characterization of this
marginal value—which reveals an explicit dependency of the
marginal value of storage on a certain statistical measure of
variability in the underlying wind power process.
As direction for future research, it would be of value to
expand the framework for analysis developed in this paper to
allow for time-variation in the RT imbalance prices, and the
possibility of statistical correlation between the wind power
and price processes. We also note that the potential value
that a WPP might derive from energy storage goes well
beyond the application of energy arbitrage considered in this
paper. For example, certain storage technologies posses the
capability of providing voltage support or frequency regulation
services—cf. [6] for a comprehensive survey of energy storage
applications. As a challenging direction for future research,
it would be of value to investigate the potential economic
tradeoffs that might emerge in using storage to tap these
multiple value streams.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem IV.3
We establish concavity of Jpi
∗
(x; θ) directly. Fix a storage
type θ ∈ R2+ and let x(1) ∈ R+ and x(2) ∈ R+ be arbitrary
forward contracts.5 Let
x(λ) = λx(1) + (1− λ)x(2)
denote a convex combination of said contracts, where λ ∈
[0, 1]. We denote by pi∗(·) ∈ Π(θ) the optimal control policy
associated with the contract x(·). And, given any admissible
policy pi ∈ Π(θ), we let {zpik } and {upik} denote the random
state and input processes induced by the policy pi.
We establish the desired result by showing:
Jpi
∗
(λ)(x(λ); θ) ≥ λ Jpi
∗
(1)(x(1); θ) + (1− λ) Jpi
∗
(2)(x(2); θ).
Consider the forward contract x(λ). And consider a policy pi(λ)
inducing the input process u
pi(λ)
k = λ u
pi∗(1)
k + (1−λ) u
pi∗(2)
k ,
where the associated state process is recursively determined
5The subscripts here are not to be confused with time indices.
by z
pi(λ)
k+1 = z
pi(λ)
k − u
pi(λ)
k for z
pi(λ)
0 = 0. It is not difficult to
see that z
pi(λ)
k = λ z
pi∗(1)
k + (1 − λ) z
pi∗(2)
k . Admissibility of
pi(λ) is therefore immediate, as the underlying constraints on
both the state and input define convex sets. It follows that
Jpi
∗
(λ)(x(λ); θ) ≥ Jpi(λ)(x(λ); θ),
by optimality of policy pi∗(λ) ∈ Π(θ) for the contract x(λ).
Expanding the expression to the right of the inequality further,
we have that
Jpi(λ)(x(λ); θ)
= N · px(λ) − E
[
N−1∑
k=0
g
(
x(λ), u
pi(λ)
k , ξk
) ]
≥ N · px(λ) − E
[
N−1∑
k=0
λ g
(
x(1), u
pi∗(1)
k , ξk
)
+ (1− λ) g
(
x(2), u
pi∗(2)
k , ξk
) ]
(14)
= λ Jpi
∗
(1)(x(1); θ) + (1− λ) Jpi
∗
(2)(x(2); θ), (15)
where the inequality (14) follows from convexity of g and the
decomposition ξk = λξk + (1− λ)ξk. The final equality (15)
follows from the optimality of the policies pi∗(1) ∈ Π(θ) and
pi∗(2) ∈ Π(θ) for the contracts x(1) and x(2) respectively. Thus,
Jpi
∗
(x; θ) is a concave function in x over R+.
B. Proof of Theorem V.1
Monotonicity is straightforward. Fix a storage type θ ∈ R2+.
Let ε ∈ R2+. Clearly, Π(θ + ε) ⊇ Π(θ) and hence J∗(θ +
ε) ≥ J∗(θ). The proof of concavity of J∗(θ) in θ over R2+ is
analogous to the proof of Theorem IV.3.
C. Proof of Theorem V.5
Fix r > 0, and write x∗(b) = x∗(θ) and pi∗(b) = pi∗(θ) to
isolate their dependence on the energy capacity parameter b,
as we have fixed r. It will be convenient to decompose the
optimal expected profit associated with a storage type θ as
J∗(θ) = pNx∗(b)− E
[
Qpi
∗(b)(x∗(b), ξ)
]
,
where
Qpi
∗(b)(x∗(b), ξ) =
N−1∑
k=0
g(x∗(b), upi
∗(b)
k , ξk)
denotes the imbalance cost realized under (x∗(b), pi∗(b), ξ).
We begin the proof by expressing the (right) partial deriva-
tive of J∗(θ) with respect to b at the origin as
∂J∗(θ)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= pN
∂x∗(b)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
− lim
ε↓0
E
[
Qpi
∗(ε)(x∗(ε), ξ)−Qpi∗(0)(x∗(0), ξ)
ε
]
. (16)
8We proceed in establishing existence of the limit through its
explicit characterization. First, define a sequence of functions
{fn}, mapping sample paths ξ ∈ [0, 1]N into R, as
fn(ξ) =
Qpi
∗(εn)(x∗(εn), ξ)−Qpi∗(0)(x∗(0), ξ)
εn
, n ∈ N
where {εn} is a sequence of non-negative real numbers
converging monotonically to zero. We will prove Theorem
V.5 through application of the Bounded Convergence Theo-
rem. We first have the following result establishing almost
sure convergence and uniform boundedness of the sequence
{fn(ξ)}. See Appendix D for its proof.
Proposition A.1. Let (R,B(R),P) denote the complete prob-
ability space according to which the random variables ξ =
(ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξN−1) are defined, where B(R) denotes the Borel
σ-algebra on R. Define the sequence of functions {fn} ac-
cording to
fn(ξ) =
Qpi
∗(εn)(x∗(εn), ξ)−Qpi∗(0)(x∗(0), ξ)
εn
, n ∈ N
where {εn} is a sequence of non-negative real numbers
converging monotonically to zero. It follows that:
(i) {fn(ξ)} is a sequence of real-valued random variables
converging almost surely to the real-valued random variable
f(ξ) defined by
f(ξ) =
∂x∗(b)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=0
(
α · |K−(x∗(0), ξ)| − β · |K+(x∗(0), ξ)|)
− (α+ β) · Λ(x∗(0), ξ) − β · 1(x∗(0),∞)(ξN−1).
The random variables f(ξ) and {fn(ξ)} are defined on the
common probability space (R,B(R),P).
(ii) There exists a constant M < ∞, such that |fn(ξ)| < M
almost surely.
It follows from Prop. A.1 and the Bounded Convergence
Theorem that limn→∞ E[fn(ξ)] = E[f(ξ)]. Note that it
suffices for uniform boundedness to hold almost surely, as
the underlying probability space is complete by assumption.
Finally, it follows from Lemma V.4 that
E
[
α · |K−(x∗(0), ξ)| − β · |K+(x∗(0), ξ)|] = pN.
The desired result follows.
D. Proof of Proposition A.1
Throughout the proof, we restrict our attention to only those
sample paths ξ, which exhibit strict crossings of the contract
x∗(0). Accordingly, define the set of sample paths ξ that
are nowhere equal to x∗(0) as S = {ξ ∈ [0, 1]N | ξk 6=
x∗(0) ∀ k}. It follows from Assumption 2 that P{ξ ∈ S} = 1.
Proof of Part (i). We first show that the sequence of
functions {fn} converges pointwise to f on S. Fix ξ ∈ S. We
begin by controlling the behavior of the sequence {fn(ξ)} for
n large enough. Denote by
I−n (ξ) = {0 ≤ k ≤ N − 2 | 1Dk(ξ)(x∗(εn)) = 1}, and
I+n (ξ) = {0 ≤ k ≤ N − 2 | 1Uk(ξ)(x∗(εn)) = 1}
the collection of time indices at which the sample path ξ
exhibits strict downcrossings and upcrossings of the level
x∗(εn), respectively.
It follows from the right continuity of the optimal contract
x∗(b) at b = 0 that there exists an integer N1(ξ) ∈ N such
that I+n (ξ) = I+N1(ξ)(ξ) and I−n (ξ) = I
−
N1(ξ)
(ξ) for all n ≥
N1(ξ). It will also be useful to define the integer
N2(ξ) = min{n ≥ N1(ξ) | εn ≤ min{r, |ξk−x∗(εn)| } ∀ k}.
Essentially, n ≥ N2(ξ) ensures that any downcrossing (up-
crossing) of the level x∗(εn) will result in a full discharge
(charge) of the energy storage in the amount of εn under the
optimal control policy pi∗(εn). We now derive a closed form
expression for the optimal imbalance cost Qpi
∗(εn)(x∗(εn), ξ)
for n ≥ N2(ξ).
Let n ≥ N2(ξ). It is not difficult to see that, under the
optimal control policy pi∗(εn) (cf. Prop. IV.2), the storage
system is fully charged (discharged) only at times immediately
following a strict ξ upcrossing (downcrossing) of x∗(εn).
More precisely, the sequence of optimal control inputs can
be explicitly expressed as
u
pi∗(εn)
k (17)
=
{
εn · 1(−∞,ξk)(x∗(εn)), k = 0
εn · 1Uk−1(ξ)(x∗(εn)) − εn · 1Dk−1(ξ)(x∗(εn)), k > 0
for k = 0, . . . , N − 1. Substituting Equation (17) into our
nominal expression for the imbalance cost
Qpi
∗(εn)(x∗(εn), ξ) =
N−1∑
k=0
g(x∗(εn), u
pi∗(εn)
k , ξk),
we have
fn(ξ) = − (α+ β)Λ(x∗(εn), ξ)− β1(x∗(εn),∞)(ξN−1)
+
(
α|K−(ξ, x∗(εn))| − β|K+(ξ, x∗(εn))|
)(
x∗(εn)− x∗(0)
εn
)
The pointwise convergence {fn} to f on S follows from the
fact that
K±(ξ, x∗(εn)) = K±(ξ, x∗(0)),
for ξ ∈ S and n ≥ N2(ξ).
We now show that the convergence is almost sure. First
notice that each function fn : RN → R—being a finite
linear combination of indicator functions defined on Borel
measurable sets—is Borel measureable. Since the composition
of measurable functions is measurable, it follows that the
composition fn(ξ) is a random variable on (R,B(R),P). The
same is true for the pointwise limit function f(ξ). Almost sure
convergence is immediate as
P
{
lim
n→∞ fn(ξ) = f(ξ)
}
≥ P
{
lim
n→∞ fn(ξ) = f(ξ)
∣∣∣ ξ ∈ S}P{ξ ∈ S} = 1.
This completes the proof of Part (i).
Proof of Part (ii). We first show uniform boundedness
of each function fn : RN → R on S. By assumption, we
have restricted the image of each random variable ξk to [0, 1]
for all k. As an immediate consequence, we have that 0 ≤
9x∗(b) ≤ 1 for all b ≥ 0. It follows from this fact, and the
right differentiability of x∗(b) at b = 0, that
B := sup
{ |x∗(εn)− x∗(0)|
εn
∣∣∣∣ n ∈ N} < ∞.
Combining this upper bound with the observation that
|K−(ξ, x∗(εn))|, |K+(ξ, x∗(εn))|, Λ(ξ, x∗(εn)) ≤ N for all
n ∈ N and ξ ∈ S, we have that
|fn(ξ)| ≤ NB · (α+ β) +N · (α+ β) + β
for all n ∈ N and ξ ∈ S. Uniform boundedness holds almost
surely as P{ξ ∈ S} = 1. This completes the proof of Part (ii).
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